The aim of this paper is to provide one potential theoretical explanation for questions why currency carry trade becomes profitable, and why a sudden unwinding of carry trade is caused. We propose a new behavioral model of currency bubbles and crashes. We consider that investors trade two currencies: the domestic currency, and the foreign currency. Investors are divided into two groups, the rational investors and the carry traders. The rational investors maximize their expected utility of their wealth in the next period. Carry traders maximize their random utility of binary choice: investing the domestic currency or investing the foreign currency.
Introduction
Many researchers have focused on the role of carry trade on currency bubble and the possibility that a sudden unwinding of carry trade might give cause to currency crisis. Recent many empirical studies have argued that currency carry trade have been a driving force behind exchange rate movements in the latest financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] and have explained the large currency crashes in terms of a sudden, massive reversal of carry trade positions. (See for instances, Gagnon, and Chaboud (2007) , Cairns, Ho and McCauley (2007) , Galati, Heath and McGuire (2007) , Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) , Melvin and Taylor (2009), and Kohler (2010) ).
A carry trade is a popular strategy for currency investors which consists of selling low interest-rate currencies and investing in high interest-rate currency. Currency carry trade is profitable if the interest differential is not completely offset by an appreciation of the low interest-rate currency. An increase in carry trade positions generally tends to weaken the low interest-rate currencies and strengthen the high interest-rate currencies. This makes profitability self-fulfilling and attracting further carry trades.
As a result of this feedback loop, carry trades tend to be associated with a gradual appreciation of the high interest-rate currency and a depreciation of the low interest-rate currency for a while. However, as some reasons such as changes in interest rate expectations lead carry traders to a sudden unwinding of carry trades, there is a tendency for the high interest-rate currencies to depreciate and the low interest-rate currencies to appreciate sharply.
The aim of this paper is to provide one potential theoretical explanation for questions how currency bubbles and crashes which describes above. We propose a new model of currency bubbles and crashes which are caused by carry trade. The high average payoffs to the carry trade means the violation of uncovered interest parity (UIP) which has been termed the forward premium puzzle: currencies with high interest rates tend to appreciate. Our model also proposes a solution for a forward premium puzzle 1 .
We consider that investors trade two currencies: the domestic currency, and the foreign currency. Investors are divided into two groups, rational investors and carry traders. The rational investors chooses that the portfolio of currencies which will maximize his/her expected utility of end-of-period wealth using asset-pricing models such as the CAPM (see e.g., Mossin (1966) and Lintner (1969) ). On the other hand, carry 1 Empirical studies consistently reject the UIP ( see, for a survey on this topic, Engel (1996) ,.
traders maximize their random utility of alternatives 2 , that is, selling foreign currency and buying domestic currency, or selling domestic currency and buying foreign currency.
We assume that a carry trader's decision-making is influenced by (i) the decisions of the other carry-traders, and (ii) the carry traders' anticipation of the payoffs to carry trade which is defined as the exponential moving average of the payoffs to carry trade. The carry-trader's utility function of an alternative is composed of the above attributes, and random variable. In our model, we show that as the interaction among carry traders, that is, the extent, that each carry-trader is influenced by the decisions of other carry-traders, is reinforced, carry traders begin to follow the herd. In the attribute (ii), we also assume that the carry-traders' expectation of the return on carry trade is adaptive. Our model indicates a mechanism that that carry-traders' herd behavior, which follows the behavior getting a majority, and their attempt to surf currency bubbles, gives cause to a bubble ended up with a crash. This also gives a plausible explanation on the forward premium puzzle.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, and in Section 4 we give a theoretical explanation on a mechanism of currency bubble and crash. We give concluding remarks in Section 5.
Model
Consider the exchange market in which two currencies are traded. t S denotes the spot 2 The qualitative choice models based on maximization of the agent's random utility has been developed by McFadden (1974 
( ) U W is the utility function, the expectation of which is to be maximized. One can take a Tayler-series approximation to ( ) EU W and differentiate it with respect to ( ) E W and ( ) V W to show that the two definitions of r are equivalent.
The utility function will have a constant coefficient of relative risk-aversion if it is exponential in form:
The solution to the one-period maximization problem considered here will be the correct solution to the general intertemporal maximization problem, if the utility function is further restricted to the logarithmic form, the limiting case as g goes to zero, which implies 1 r = , or if events occurring during the period are independent of the expected returns that prevail in the following period. The corresponding first-order conditions are:
where m denotes the Lagrangian. Holdings of domestic and foreign currencies of the optimal portfolio are:
The well-known uncovered interest-rate parity (UCIP) is written as
Using the UCIP (4), the equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:
Therefore, the rational investors' transaction depends on the expected risk premiums of risky assets. The excess demand (or excess supply) for two currencies by rational investors is calculated by subtracting t is, each of them is selling the foreign currency and buying the domestic currency or selling the domestic currency and buying the foreign currency. We consider that the individual carry trader maximizes his/her random utility of the alternatives. That is, he/she chooses an alternative with the highest utility 5 . The carry-trader's random utility function is composed of the deterministic part which is assumed to represent average behavior, and a nondeterministic part to represent random deviations from this average. The random utility of alternatives is given as:
where i e is a random variable. The carry trader attaches a value, i U to each of two alternatives, that is, investing in domestic currency financed by selling in the foreign currency (labeled +), and investing in foreign currency financed by selling in the domestic currency (labeled-).
A common procedure used in both economics and finance is to assume the existence of a "representative" or "average" individual who is assumed to have tastes equal to the average over all decision makers. Two possible explanations for the stochastic term are given by Hausman and Wise (1978) . The first is that a carry trader behaves randomly, perhaps due to random firing of neurons; so that faced repeatedly with the same alternative set. The same individual makes different choices. Second is that there are unobserved characteristics of the individual and unobserved attributes of the alternatives. Given the specification of the utility function, each carry trader is assumed to choose the alternative that maximizes his utility. The maximization of the random utility gives the probability with which each alternative is chosen. The probability that he chooses each alternative is given as :
We assume that individual carry trader's decision-making is influenced by (i) the other 
where the parameter l is assumed to be positive and constant. Given l is a positive, an increase in t e raises the utility of selling the foreign currency and buying the domestic currency, and reduces the utility of selling the domestic currency and buying foreign currency in the direction of the minority decision. This means that the carry trader has a tendency to be in favor of the majority decision. 
, 1
where the parameterq is constant( 0 1 q < < (1 ) ,
where 0 1 q < < . It means that the carry-trader's expectation on the risk premium is adaptive.
As the expected return t H to carry trade is higher, the utility of selling the foreign currency and buying the domestic currency raises, and the utility of selling the domestic currency and buying foreign currency is reduced.
The equations (10), and (11) means that the carry traders adapt the carry strategies which are a strategy that buys a currency with high return and sells currencies with poor returns over the past periods with a high probability 6 . McFadden (1974) 
The probability that a utility-maximizing carry trader will choose each alternative, is expressed as:
Now we introduce a variable n which is the probability that a transition is attempted by one of the carry-traders, and follows a uniform distribution over carry-traders. We assume that one carry-trader attempts a trade in one time unit. The individual transition probabilities per an unit time period is described as 
The random variable n determines the time scale in which a transition which is attempted by a carry trader occurs.
( ) t p ē
is the transition probability that one of the carry traders who sell the foreign currency and buy the domestic currency. Inversely ( ) t p e the transition probability that one of the carry traders who sell the domestic currency and buy the foreign 6 The fact that momentum strategies yield significant profits, have been well investigated. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine a variety of momentum strategies and document that strategies earn profits.
currency.
The effects of l and t H on the transition probabilities can be described as follows:
i)
A positive l enlarges the transition probability in favor of the majority choice and reduces the transition probability in the direction of the minority choice.
This positive feedback effect grows for a growing imbalance of choices.
ii) A positive expected return on carry trade t H increases the probability that a carry trader changes the investment currency from the foreign currency to the domestic currency, and reduces the probability of changing the investment currency from the domestic currency to the foreign currency, and vice versa for 
where 
The equation (15) is called as the master equation (See Gardiner (1985) ). When the number of carry traders is large, the equation (15) is equivalent to the dynamic equation of the mean t X of ( ) t p e (see Weidlich and Haag (1983) 
where
+ denotes the number of carry traders who the carry traders who sell the foreign currency and buy the domestic currency at the period t, and t n -denotes the number of carry traders who sell the domestic currency and buy the foreign currency at the period t. The solution of (17) corresponds to the maximum of the stationary distribution ( ) st t p e of the master equation (15), and the equation of (17) describes the collective behavior of the representative carry-trader.
Using the difference of ˆt s from period t to period t+1, the aggregate excess demand for the domestic currency by all carry traders is defined as
where Q denotes the amount of the domestic currency which is exchanged in any transaction by a carry trader, and is assumed to be constant. The equation (18) will be utilized when the market exchange rates are calculated under the market clearing conditions in section 2.4.
Collective behavior of the representative carry traders
Before we discuss about currency bubble and crash, we describe the collective behavior of the representative carry traders using equation (17). As the above conditions i) and ii) indicate, the carry trader's transition probability depends on the variables l and t H . For convenience of analysis, let us assume that the return on carry trade t H is a parameter H . The solutions of the mean equation (17) ii)
The case of
H is determined by the equation (17) is plotted for 1 l > .
iii)
Two of the tree solutions
An increase (a decrease) in the expected return on carry trade H causes the curve which indicates the transcendental equation (17) to shift up (down), so that the solutions rise (fall). Figure 3 shows the states that two of the tree solutions coincide.
iv) 
Market-clearing exchange rates
The market clearing condition requires that the aggregated excess demand (supply) for each currency by rational investors is equal to the aggregated excess demand (supply) by currency traders from the period t-1 to the period t. That is, if one carry-trader changes from an investment in the foreign currency to an investment in the domestic currency, then the exchange rate t S is adjusted such that rational investors supply the corresponding domestic currency and demand the corresponding foreign currency. That is,
For simplicity of analysis we assume that the interest rate of each currency is fixed over time. Then from equation (6) the aggregated excess demands for currency by rational investors are obtained by multiplying the number M of rational investors:
Then, the market clearing conditions are described as ( ) ( )
Solving the equations (19) with respect to changes on the exchange rate proportionally with respect to the carry traders' excess demand for the domestic currency, 
